• Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Testimony of Defendant
• Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
• Defendant’s Motion to Strike
• Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
• Plaintiff's Memorandum in support of motion to compel to testimony
• Notice of Hearing

Now comes the Plaintiff, Pro Se, John J. Loftus, and respectfully requests that the Court issue an order compelling Defendant’s testimony and attendance at deposition within ten (10) days, and that Defendant be further enjoined under penalty of citation for criminal contempt, from refusing to attend said deposition, and from refusing to answer any questions at said deposition on grounds of a privilege against self-incrimination, which privilege is only applicable to criminal cases, and is expressly prohibited by Florida statute from invocation in this form of civil case at bar.

1. On Wednesday, May 14, 2002, Plaintiff telephoned Defendant’s counsel to set a date for hearings on Defendant’s Motions, which date was agreed to, but Defendant’s counsel refused to set a date for Defendant’s deposition, on the grounds that Defendant’s counsel was encumbered with other trial matters until July, 2002..
2. More than thirty (days) having expired from time of service to the date of deposition, Plaintiff is entitled under the rules to take Defendant’s deposition forthwith on or after May 27, 2002.. Defendant’s deposition had already been delayed for more than a month by Defendant’s willful misconduct, as set forth in the companion Motion for Sanctions.
3. By way of compromise, Plaintiff made the following offer. If it was Defendant’s intention to refuse to answer any questions on 5^th amendment grounds, as he has done in one or more prior cases, then Plaintiff offered to take an abbreviated deposition so that the issue of privilege could be expeditiously determined by this Court on the May 29^th hearing.
4. Plaintiff further offered to have this deposition, of approximately fifteen minutes in length, to record the invocation of privilege, taken in Defendant’s counsel’s office on May 27 or May 28 so as not to inconvenience counsel’s trial schedule..
5. Defendant’s counsel stated that he would ponder this compromise and promptly respond to Plaintiff. Plaintiff called Counsel for Defendant repeatedly over the next several days but has still received no response. Plaintiff has no recourse but to move the Court for an order to compel Defendant’s attendance and testimony. and enjoin him from invoking any criminal privileges inapplicable to this civil litigation.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this document has been forwarded by First Class. U.S. Mail to Robert F. McKee, 1718 E. 7^th Ave., Suite 301 (33605) P.O..Box 75638, Tampa, Florida 33675-0638, on this 17^th day of May, 2002,

Now comes the Plaintiff, Pro Se, John J. Loftus, and respectfully requests that the Court issue an order compelling Defendant to pay Plaintiffs costs and expenses incurred as a result of Defendant’s willful and deliberate misconduct, to wit, his repeated and recent disregard of the laws prohibiting the filing of false information within the official reports of his charities to the State of Florida, and for such further remedies and orders as the Court deems just to sanction Defendant’s latest acts of misconduct.

1. Defendant, in violation of his sworn legal duty as an officer of an incorporated Florida Charity, knowingly maintained and still maintains a false address, 5207 E. 127^th Ave., Tampa, Florida, as his official address on file with the state of Florida, which was his sworn duty to keep current as the official Registered Agent of an incorporated charity in the State of Florida, which address Defendant has not lived at for almost a year.
2. Further, on March 11, 2002, nine months after moving from 5207 E. 127^th Ave., Tampa, Florida, and leaving no forwarding address, Defendant still persisted in listing  the same false address as the Director of yet another charity in its official report to the State of Florida, which false address was certified under oath as true by Defendant’s charity, and which false report was filed by the Secretary of State on March 11, 2002.
3. One week later, Plaintiff reviewed Defendant’s filings with the Secretary of State, and in reliance upon the lawful obligations of Defendant, both individually and corporately as an officer of his various charities, to file true and correct current addresses for Registered Agents and Directors, caused Plaintiff to erroneously rely on Defendant’s false address for service of the Complaint.
4. In reliance on Defendant’s false and incorrect filings, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on March 20, and hired a process server to attempt service of process on Defendant’s false address, . 5207 E. 127^th Ave., Tampa, Florida.
5. During the next month, Plaintiff attempted to locate Defendant’s true address, at a cost of considerable time and expense. Defendant’s true and current address does not appear and has never appeared on any official record with the State of Florida. This is a clear and willful breach of Defendant’s lawful obligation to maintain a correct address as Registered Agent for service of process, and yet another example of Defendant’s near total disregard for the laws of the State of Florida regulating charities.
6. Plaintiff subsequently learned that Defendant had indeed moved from 5207 E. 127^th Ave., Tampa, Florida and had contracted to sell his previous home sometime in early 2001, and that the present occupant and purchaser of Defendant’s home stated that in fact she had personally lived at the address listed by Defendant as his current address since July 2001, and that she was constantly being harassed by people looking for Defendant, who had left no forwarding address..
7. It is a matter of official public record, of which the court can take judicial notice, both from the two returns of process on file with the Clerk and/or from the Secretary of State’s official records, available on line, that Defendant maintained one address while listing another, and that no plausible lawful explanation exists but that Defendant wished to avoid his legal responsibility to accept service of process despite his status as Registered Agent for service of process for his charities.
8. Due to Defendant’s willful and deliberate pattern of false charitable filings, which continued right up to the very week before the instant complaint was filed on March 20, 2002, Plaintiff suffered personal and direct economic damages. Plaintiff incurred the expense of investigation and considerable delay before Defendant’s true street address (and then the location of his unlisted apartment within the apartment complex) could be determined, and then suffered further cost for an additional process server.
9. Defendant’s misconduct was intended to and did delay Plaintiff ‘s service of process upon Defendant. Further, his misconduct was intended to and did delay Plaintiff’s taking of Defendant’s deposition, because the 30 day waiting period following service of process did not commence to run until April 17, 2002. Even then, the second service of process was only completed upon Defendant’s wife only after extraordinary and unusual methods of investigation not available to the average citizen of Florida.
10. Plaintiff believes that Defendant’s pattern of willful disregard of the laws of Florida is but a part of Defendant’s consistent pattern of misusing Charitable entities for his own purposes. Moreover, defendant’s misconduct is consistent with an intent to delay any discovery by Plaintiff of his activities until August 2002, when a final determination is due regarding his suitability for employment with the University of South Florida.
11. Under these circumstances, it would be unconscionable and contrary to the public interest to accede to the request by Defendant’s counsel to further delay defendant’s deposition until July 2002.. Moreover, it would permit Defendant to benefit from his devious strategy of providing false information to the official public records.
12. In order to remedy Defendant’s willful obstruction of service and willful delay of Plaintiff’s discovery, Plaintiff moves this Court for an Order granting Plaintiff permission to take such additional depositions of Defendant as Plaintiff deems necessary without further leave of Court, upon ten days notice to Defendant’s counsel. (see also Plaintiff’s companion Motion to Compel Defendant’s appearance and testimony at Deposition, subject to sanctions of criminal contempt)
13. Plaintiff requests that it be further ordered that , in view of Defendant’s latest and most recent misconduct by the false and incorrect filings in 2001-2002, that Defendant is estopped from raising the defense of the Statute of limitations in this litigation.
14. And Plaintiff requests that Defendant be further ordered that, in view of the considerable cost in Plaintiff’s time and money incurred by Defendant’s misconduct, that Defendant is estopped from asserting that Plaintiff lacks standing as an “aggrieved person” in this litigation to contest Defendant’s pattern of misconduct with regard to Defendant’s Florida charities,
15. And that Defendant be further ordered to reimburse Plaintiff $50 for the additional cost for a process server in serving the Complaint a second time, and the sum of $1,000 to reimburse Plaintiff for his personal time and effort expended in locating Defendant’s true address.
16. And that Defendant be ordered forthwith to list his true address on each and every false filing he has made with the Secretary of State of the State of Florida.
17. And that, pursuant to Statute, the Court also refer the instant matter to the Attorney General of the State of Florida, as the Chief Officer for investigating violations of the laws of Florida regulating filings of false reports by charitable entities, for such additional remedies, including punitive damages, as he may deem appropriate.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this document has been forwarded by First Class U.S. Mail to Atty. Robert F. McKee, 1718 E. 7^th Ave, Suite 301 (33605)

PO Box 75638, Tampa FL 33675-0638, on this 17^th day of May, 2002..

Respectfully submitted,

John J. Loftus
Plaintiff, Pro Se
3560 Coquina Key Drive SE
St. Petersburg, FL 33705
(727) 821-5227

Defendant’s deposition has already been delayed by a month, entirely due to Defendant’s misconduct in filing or maintaining false addresses with the State of Florida in order to avoid service of process, which Defendant had a legal obligation to do as the registered agent for service of process on one charity, and a director of the other charity.

Before filing this Complaint of March 20, Defendant checked with the Florida department of Corporations for both of Defendant’s current charities and determined that on March 10, Defendant’s charity filed a report listing his current address . in that he repeatedly filed false and misleading

The Plaintiff, John J. Loftus, submits this memorandum in opposition to the Defendant’s, Sami A. Al Arian, Motion to Strike.The motion to strike should be denied as the subject paragraphs are neither immaterial to Plaintiff’s asserted cause of action under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Sections 501.201, et seq., Florida. Statutes (2000) (hereinafter referred to as “FUDTPA”) nor are they impertinent or scandalous. They are simply the chronological record of Defendant’s egregious misconduct, and are necessary to understand the consistent and continuing nature of his scheme over the last twelve years..

All the paragraphs Defendant seeks to have stricken allege facts demonstrating a violation of FDUPTA. Section 501.204 (1), Florida Statutes, declares unlawful acts and practices:

Unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.

This new cause of action, based on a model Federal Trade Commission regulatory structure, now adopted by thirty nine states, was intended to provide consumers with a prompt and speedy remedy against those who violate common standards of conscience and fairness in their dealings with the public. FDUPTA was intended by the Legislature to be construed liberally. See Fla. Stat.§ 501.202 (2002); Samuels v. King Motor Company, 782 So.2d 489, 498 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2001); Cummings v. Warren Henry Motors, Inc,, 648 So.2d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1995).

In this new cause of action, a plaintiff need only plead that the conduct complained of was deceptive or unfair and the plaintiff was aggrieved by the Defendant’s act. See Shibata v. Marco Lim, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (M.D. Fla.); Macias v. HBC of Florida, Inc., 694 So.2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). It is enough to show a violation of FDUPTA if Plaintiff merely sets forth sufficient facts alleging that Defendant engaged in practices which offend established public policy because such practices are "immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers." Samuels v. King Motor Company, 782 So.2d 489, 498 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2001); Cummings v. Warren Henry Motors, Inc,, 648 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1995); Urling, at 453, quoting Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7^th Cir. 1976).

Plaintiff has plead in lengthy detail the specifics of Defendant’s deceptive, unfair, unconscionable and immoral acts or practices, which are contrary to public policy. The Complaint recounts an extensive history of such practices by Defendant: 1) a scheme to to obtain charitable standing [misrepresentations in application for tax exempt status (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 8-13) ; bait and switch (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 14-25) ; false advertising (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 26-32) ; employment of a fictitious name: alter ego of a criminal enterprise (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 33-88)]

Once having obtained non-profit tax exempt status, (See Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 7A, et. Seq.) Defendant used his supposed charities for an even more unconscionable and immoral practice: money laundering to fund terrorist activities (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 89-136). The allegations contained in these paragraphs are material to Plaintiff’s asserted cause of action, and establish far more than the minimum to set forth a violation of FUDTPA .

Further, the paragraphs Defendant seeks to have stricken are not impertinent because they provide specific details of Defendant’s deceptive, unfair, unconscionable and immoral acts or practices in violation of FUDTPA. It is precisely because Defendant’s actions and practices offend established public policy that they may seem scandalous. Terrorists activities are scandalous. However, the Complaint establishes beyond doubt that the majority of the eveidence against Defendant comes from his own mouth from his own videotapes.

Whatever scandal exists is entirely of Defendant’s own making. These allegations detailing that Defendant engaged in practices which offend established public policy are necessary to allege a violation of FUDTPA. The only permissible legal standard under the act for striking a complaint would be for defendant to assert that Plaintiff’s case was frivolous in its entirety. This he has not even alleged, and since the Defendant has been caught red-handed on film, could never be sustained.

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons stated above, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny the Defendant’s Motion to Strike.

Respectfully submitted,

John J. Loftus
Plaintiff, Pro Se
3560 Coquina Key Drive SE
St. Petersburg, FL 33705
727) 821-5227

The Plaintiff, John J. Loftus, submits this memorandum in opposition to the Defendant’s, Sami A. Al Arian, Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively, for a More Definite Statement. It is well established under Florida law that the trial court must take all allegations alleged in the complaint as true when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Sarkis v. Pafford Oil Company, Inc., 697 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1997). Assuming all allegations in the complaint are true, Plaintiff has clearly stated a prima facie case alleging the Defendant’s violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201 - 501.213. Furthermore, Plaintiff has provided ample specific factual allegations for the Defendant to frame a responsive pleading.

I.Plaintiff Has Stated a Prima Facie Case Alleging the Defendant’s Violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act

The Defendant’s Motion has mischaracterized the elements of a prima facie case under FDUTPA, perhaps because it so rarely used in this State. The gravamen of this act is not at all in the nature of a fraud complaint, with its requisites of reliance, specific deception and special requirements for standing. It is a mater of black letter law that this act was passed to avoid imposing those burdens upon plaintiffs in order to vindicate the protection of the interests of the public at large..

The Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act was intended by the Legislature to be construed liberally to protect the public’s interest from unfair and deceptive practices. See Fla. Stat.§ 501.202 (2002); Samuels v. King Motor Company, 782 So.2d 489, 498 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2001); Cummings v. Warren Henry Motors, Inc,, 648 So.2d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1995). Indeed, the elements of the cause of action are short and simple: plaintiff need only plead (1) that the conduct complained of was deceptive or unfair and (2) that the plaintiff was aggrieved by the Defendant’s act. See Shibata v. Marco Lim, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (M.D. Fla.); Macias v. HBC of Florida, Inc., 694 So.2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).

Plaintiff has gone far above the minimum and has plead in detailed specifics that the Defendant engaged in a length series of deceptive, unfair, unconscionable and immoral acts or practices which were contrary to public policy and that the Defendant’s practices of funneling donations, including Plaintiff’s donation (See Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 7A), to the Defendant’s purported charitable organizations to fund terrorist operations aggrieved the Plaintiff and, more importantly, all others who donated.

Further, Plaintiff has plead the specifics of Defendant’s twelve year long complex and continuing scheme. The Complaint is lengthy only because it describes in detail each of the ongoing unfair, unconscionable, and immoral practices in which Defendant has engaged. The Complaint sets forth the principal methods of this scheme under the following groups of unfair and deceptive practices: to obtain charitable donations by means of an improper application for tax exempt status (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 8-13) ; bait and switch (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 14-25) ; false advertising (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 26-32) ; deception by fictitious name: alter ego of a criminal enterprise (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 33-88)].

Once having obtained charitable status by use of these unfair, unconscionable, and immoral practices, Defendant then used his various “charities” as fronts for money laundering to fund terrorist activities (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 89-136). Far from being a mild mannered Professor with a kind heart, the history books list Plaintiff as one of the founders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Next to Al Qaida, PIJ is listed as one of the most evil and dangerous terrorist organizations in the world. Plaintiff’s associates have publicly and cheerfully claimed responsibility for multiple murders, stabbings, car bombings, and suicide bombings. Defendant’s own videotapes show him in his own words as racist, violent. and dedicated to the destruction of America and Israel.

Plaintiff has alleged that he is aggrieved by the Defendant’s actions on multiple grounds: Plaintiff donated to one of Defendant’s false charitable entities (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 7(A)), Plaintiff’s burden as a taxpayer has been increased (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 7(B)) because of Defendant’s false charitable entities, Plaintiff’s contributions to legitimate charities fighting racism and religious discrimination have been diminished by Defendant’s false charitable entities with racist and terrorist purposes (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 7(C), and Plaintiff’s civil rights have been chilled by Defendant’s racist and terrorist purposes in Plaintiff’s community (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 7(D).

Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiff discovered that yet again Defendant, a Registered Agent for Service of Process, had breached his duties under the laws and regulations governing Florida charities by multiple filings of false addresses to avoid service. As set forth more fully in Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiff suffered personal economic loss as a direct result of Defendant’s most recent deceptive practices with regard to his “charities”. Indeed, it would be hard to conceive of a Plaintiff more directly aggrieved by Defendant’s willful misconduct.

Defendant is incorrect in stating that Plaintiff has failed to allege enough of the particulars to state a claim under FDUTPA. .Quite apart from the simplified cause of action under this Act, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.110(b) only requires a claim for relief to state a cause of action and to set forth a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, the ultimate facts showing the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment.

Plaintiff’s complaint satisfies all these elements. Plaintiff has asserted that he contributed to one or more of Defendant’s purported charities (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 7(A)) and that these purported charities that Defendant is involved with include the Islamic Concern Project, the International Committee for Palestine, and the World Islamic Studies Enterprise (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 4). No other specificity is required. Allegations of time and place are necessary only if without them the statement of the claim is so vague and ambiguous that the other party cannot adequately frame an answer. Sarasota Cloth Fabric & Foam , Inc. v. Benes, 482 So.2d 574, 576 ( Fla. 5^th DCA 1986).

Plaintiff has alleged satisfaction of the statute of limitations by the continuing nature of Defendant’s deceptive, unfair, unconscionable and immoral acts or practices (Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 99). Having alleged the continuous and ongoing nature of Defendant’s acts and practices, enumeration of the specific dates Plaintiff’s contributions were misused is not only impracticable but also only within Defendant’s knowledge not Plaintiff’s , facts which are discoverable.

Plaintiff has plainly alleged misrepresentations which were made by Defendant, as discussed above. Plaintiff need not allege the identity of the “associates. ” Although the Complaint names several members of his charities who are now in prison or wanted for terrorism, the identites of the remainder could only be obtained through discovery. This is not a criminal complaint for conspiracy, it is a consumer complaint under FDUTPA.

Plaintiff therefore has satisfied his obligation to plead a cause of action under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.

II.Plaintiff Has Not Asserted a Cause of Action for Fraud

Defendant has attempted to mischaracterize Plaintiff’s complaint as one alleging fraud. But Plaintiff deliberately chose to bring a FDUTPA Count instead of a fraud count. The two are entirely different causes of action. Defendant’s strategy is to convince the Court to graft the elements of one onto the other. (See Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 8-136 and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively, for More Definite Statement ¶ 3).

Defendant’s attempt to graft fraud elements into FDUTPA is forbidden in Florida. It has been well settled that the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act does not and cannot require a finding of fraud in order to allege a violation under the act. See Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1985). The Urling court explained that the legislature had given great weight to the federal courts’ interpretation of the Federal Trade Commission Act which states that false, unfair or deceptive acts are not defined as those which would constitute or be synonymous with fraud. Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So.2d 453 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1985) citing Rollins v. Heller, 454 So.2d 580 (Fla.3d DCA 1984)(relying on D.D.D. Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm., 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7^th Cir. 1942)).

Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendant engaged in practices which offend established public policy because such practices are either “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” Samuels v. King Motor Company, 782 So.2d 489, 498 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2001); Cummings v. Warren Henry Motors, Inc,, 648 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1995); Urling, at 453, quoting Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7^th Cir. 1976).

Finally, Defendant’s motion for more definite statement is without merit. As demonstrated above, Plaintiff has plead in detailed specifics the many< deceptive, unfair, unconscionable, and immoral practices Defendant has engaged in which has aggrieved Plaintiff.

Based on the reasons stated above, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively, for a More Definite Statement, and direct the Defendant to enter an answer in this matter.

JOHN J. LOFTUS, Plaintiff Pro Se
3560 Coquina Key Drive SE
St. Petersburg, FL. 33705
(727) 821-5227 (Phone).
(727) 894-1801 (Fax)

In order to assist the court in a full understanding of the potential issues on both sides of the case and to perfect the record in event of appeal, and in the interests of Justice, Plaintiff requests that the Court review the following case law favorable to Defendant on 5^th amendment claims in cases from other jurisdictions arising under a comparable civil cause of action for unfair and deceptive practices (copies attached).

1. United states District Court for the District of Colorado, 924 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1997)(whether civil discovery may be avoided on 5^th amendment grounds when the penalties are more criminal than civil in nature)
2. Farricelli v. Connecticut, 1996 Conn. Super. Lexis 2232 (1996)(whether civil discovery should be deferred pending outcome of parallel criminal proceedings)
3. Atty. General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790 (1982)(even if Federal 5^th amendment only requires use immunity in civil discovery, whether a state constitution can require a higher standard of transactional immunity to protect defendant from further criminal prosecution)
4. Kohn v. Minnesota, 336 N.W.2d 292 (Minn. S.Ct. 1983)(whether an individual acting as corporate agent has a 5^th amendment privilege against self-incrimination which he may invoke when the state seeks to compel the agent to give answers to interrogatories)
5. Henson. V. Citizens Bank, 549 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App. 1977)(whether plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed for invocation of 5^th Amendment to avoid discovery)
6. (Case of first impression, novel issue of law) Where it is clear that a 5^th Amendment privilege could be asserted by Defendant upon the facts alleged in the Plaintiff’s Complaint, whether Fl. Stat. 501.203(2) deprives this court of its normal powers to compel Defendant’s response to discovery or whether the Court must first seek permission from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, or from the Office of the State Attorney for Hillsborough County, or from the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Florida, or the from the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida.

Plaintiff believes that it is his ethical duty to call the Court’s attention to significant legal and constitutional issues which could or should be alleged by Defendant at the outset of this litigation, prior to the granting of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery. Moreover, Plaintiff respectfully suggests that the resolution of these issues ad limine would be in the interests of the speedy and efficient administration of Justice.

Notwithstanding the above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court rule in favor of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Testimony in this case, on the grounds that the above arguments are not applicable in this jurisdiction, or do not apply to the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, or are otherwise distinguishable from the case at bar under the Statutes and Constitution of the State of Florida.

Furthermore, for the reasons stated in the Complaint, Plaintiff believes most strongly that if the Defendant is permitted to assert a 5^th amendment privilege against potential criminal incrimination in this civil litigation, he will have successfully stymied the last possible attempt to compel him to account to the people of Florida for his actions and will never be prosecuted in any criminal forum, federal or state.

Plaintiff has been informed that the U.S. government has just notified the Government of the State of Israel that it is unlikely that criminal charges will ever be filed against the Defendant, as virtually all the witnesses against him have inadvertently been permitted to leave the country and now reside in nations where no extradition is possible. To put it bluntly, Defendant is going to get away with murder, including the murder of one or more American citizens.

If it is too late for Justice from the Department of Justice, at least our citizens have the right to the truth. The only way to achieve that is to enforce the law and compel the defendant to answer under oath. It is inevitable that, unless this court compels Defendant’s testimony, he will smirk in silence in the sure and certain knowledge that he has won.

To allow the Defendant to entirely evade civil discovery would be such an incongruous result that it would greatly diminish the public’s support for and belief in the open and efficient administration of the law, and would cause great shame and discredit to the judicial system.

Even if this Court grants Summary Judgment for the Plaintiff based on the adverse inferences to be drawn from Defendant’s silence, Defendant could easily evade punishment of any kind by filing for bankruptcy protection, and avoiding deportation on the grounds that no other nation is willing to accept him, which appears to be the likely result.

Since Defendant is currently suspended with full pay from a publicly funded university, it is entirely possible that he will continue to be a financial burden to the taxpayers of Florida for months, if not years to come. Even if his public employment is severed, he will continue in the future, as he has done so demonstrably in the past, to exploit his tax exempt status as a leader of his private educational entities.

Unless Defendant is compelled in this case to confront and admit the record of his perfidious behavior, the Court must admit the clear and likely probability that nothing will ever happen to him. He will remain free to continue his clear and consistent pattern of corrupting the morals of the young people of Florida. He will be free to teach them racism and violence, as he has in the past, as brazenly recorded on his own videotapes.

He will be free to call upon his present and future students to bring about “Death to America,” as he has in the past. He will, while enjoying the subsidy of American taxpayers, be free to encourage and support acts of terrorism against them, as he has done in the past. He will be free to create and abandon more charitable entities as shells for future money laundering, as he has done in the past.

To allow Defendant to avoid all his responsibilities as an officer of publicly regulated charities would be anathema. To permit him to avoid discovery of any kind would be an unconscionable result and an outrage to the public trust in its government and officials. In the long run, this court must demonstrate to the citizens of this state that the fundamental principle of Justice remains alive: “there is no wrong without a remedy.”

Respectfully submitted,

John J. Loftus
Plaintiff, Pro Se
3560 Coquina Key Drive SE
St. Petersburg, FL 33705
(727) 821-5227

back to top of page

---

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

CIVIL DIVISION

JOHN J. LOFTUS, Pro Se
Plaintiff,

v

SAMI A. AL ARIAN
Defendant.

CASE NO.: 02-02563

---

NOTICE OF HEARING

TO:Atty. Robert F. McKee
1718 Seventh Avenue
Suite 301
P.O .Box 75638
Tampa, Florida 33675-0638

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above-styled cause has been set for hearing as designated below

DATE: May 29, 2002

TIME: 11-12 A.M.

JUDGE: Little

PLACE: Hillsborough County Courthouse
419 Pierce Street
Room 311
Tampa, Florida



SPECIFIC MATTERS TO BE HEARD:

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Testimony of Defendant

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

TIME ALLOTTED:

PLEASE be governed accordingly.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail to the above-named addressee(s) this 17th day of May, 2002 .






JOHN J. LOFTUS, Plaintiff Pro Se
3560 Coquina Key Drive SE
St. Petersburg, FL. 33705
(727) 821-5227 (Phone).
(727) 894-1801 (Fax)

back to top of page

---